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Abstract
States can do  much to tap community-level  energies and  the local  level.  These alliances can also  be very effective
resources for development  if they seek to  interact more  in catalyzing  collective  action at community  level,  and
synergistically with local communities.  The broader spin-  reducing "local capture" by  vested  interests.
off is creating a developmental  society and polity.  Using  There are several  encouraging  points that emerge  from
case studies from Asia and Latin America,  Das Gupta,  these case studies.  First, these powerful  institutional
Granvoinnet,  and Romani show how:  changes do not necessarily take  long to generate.  Second,
o  State  efforts to bring about land reform, tenancy  they can be achieved  in a  diversity of settings: tightly knit
reform, and  expanding non-crop  sources  of income can  or loose-knit communities; war-ravaged  or relatively
broaden  the distribution  of power in  rural communities,  stable; democratic  or authoritarian; with  land  reform or
laying the basis for more effective  community-driven  (if carefully managed)  even without. Third,  there are
collective  action; and  strong political payoffs  in  terms of legitimacy  and
* Higher  levels of government can  form alliances  with  popular support for those who support such
communities,  putting pressure  on local authorities  from  developmental  action.
above  and below to improve  development  outcomes  at
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i1.  Introduction
A major development challenge facing us today is How can poor developing
countries make their institutional  settings more conducive to growth and  poverty
reduction?  This has been shown to be key to better development outcomes.  Studies have
illustrated how development outcomes  are shaped by the nature of formal and informal
institutions, as well as by the type of political regimes and administrative organization.I
However,  these analyses tend to focus more on the comparative dynamics of these
systems, and less on the more challenging question of how to move from dysfunctional
institutional settings to those with greater development effectiveness.  Here we focus on a
subset of issues related to improving service delivery at community level, and more
broadly to helping achieve  a transition to better-functioning institutional settings.
With growing awareness  of the limitations of traditional "top-down" approaches  for
development  and poverty reduction, interest has shifted to the potentially powerful role of
community participation in enhancing local public service delivery. This requires
understanding the dynamics of communities and of local administrations,  and their
interaction with higher levels of administration.
Communities are characterized by a dense network of multi-stranded  relationships,
the dynamics of which can obstruct or facilitate development.  Involving local communities
in the development process has several advantages, because they have direct knowledge of
the situation (despite asymmetries in information between members) and a direct stake in
the outcomes.  Local information can be put to good use in many ways for planning and
implementing programs,2 though care must be exercised to avoid negative outcomes
(Platteau 2002, Tendler 2000).  Local information can also be very useful in monitoring
the use of program funds and of service delivery.3 This is especially strong when those
being monitored have close ties to the community - sanctions for offences are hard to
ignore when they come from people with whom one necessarily has multi-stranded and
longstanding relationships.
Yet, many communities  are characterized by serious power imbalances, which place
severe constraints on community-based development.  Where the poor are heavily
dependent on vertical links with local elites, it is difficult to form the horizontal
associations necessary for organizing collective action for the common good. Moreover,
there is real danger of "local capture" of development programs, with local elites thwarting
efforts at collective action or monopolizing their benefits.4 In such settings, higher levels
1  See for example Bardhan (1996),  Evans  (1995,1996), Manor (1999), North (1989, 1991), Ostrom,
Schroeder, and Wynne (1993), Ostrom and Walker (1997), Putnam (1993)  and World Bank (1998).
2For example,  providing credit to rural communities  is often possible only with organized use of local
knowledge  of individual  credit-worthiness  and  community  sanctions  against  defaulters:  without this,  credit
agencies  shy  away  from providing credit  to  the poor, because of the  heavy costs of information-gathering
(Kohli  1987:135).
3 Wade (1997),  Probe Team (1999).
4  Bardhan and Mookheree (1998,  1999).of government may actually be better motivated to help the disadvantaged than local
agencies influenced by local vested interests.5
We argue that the possibility for generating developmental state-community
synergies is greatly enhanced by interventions which reduce serious power imbalances
within communities - for example through land reform, tenancy reform,  and developing
non-crop sources of income. This reduces poor people's dependence on local elites,
helping prepare communities  for initiating collective action, and for collaborating  amongst
themselves  and with government agencies.6 As we illustrate, it takes much more careful
design and effort to achieve similar development gains in more inegalitarian-settings.
Secondly, we argue that higher levels of the state can catalyze  institutional change to
improve service delivery at the local level. By forming alliances with communities -
enabling them to demand better service delivery from local agencies and monitor their
performance - higher levels of government can potentially bypass local vested interests
and make local agencies more responsive to citizens (Figure  1). This can help higher levels
of the state to achieve their development  goals, and, importantly, to gain legitimacy  and
grassroots support.
The literature can sometimes suggest that institutional change is a slow process, and
that the emergence of functional institutions is almost a matter of historical accident rather
than of deliberate engineering.7 Yet, both history and institutional re-structuring  shape
institutional outcomes. We discuss examples  from East Asia and Brazil, which illustrate
how quickly such powerful institutional changes  can be wrought.  These changes can
release local energies for development:  catalyzing local initiatives and freeing people to
engage in a range of activities to improve their economic and political conditions.
Using case studies, we illustrate how the effectiveness of efforts at initiating
institutional change at local and community level is enhanced by:
*  Reducing the potential for "local capture"
*  Maintaining close links between supra-local,  local and community institutional
structures, for easy collaboration and flow of information
*  Changing the mode of operation of central and local government agencies to support
decentralized decision-making
*  Enhancing the incentives of frontline workers, and strengthening accountability to
communities
*  Generating community demand for better public services and goods
*  Providing financial incentives and technical and other support to communities, with
fiscal measures to promote ownership  and accountability
For example, the federal government in the United States has a long history of protecting minority
civil rights better than state governments  (Foner 1989).  This may be because of ideological reasons,  various
political and electoral  motives, or merely because the center is detached from specific local power
relationships.
6 Das Gupta, Grandvoinnet and Romani (2000).
77North (1989,  1991).
2*  Sustaining strong political backing for these reforms.
We begin with a brief analysis of the challenges of fighting "local capture",
especially in very hierarchical  settings. We continue by illustrating some key obstacles to
effective local service delivery and how they can be averted,  drawing on Wade's  (1982,
1997) comparison of the South Korean and Indian canal irrigation agencies. This is
followed by discussion of some country case studies of efforts to redesign local agencies'
incentives  and increase community participation in service  delivery. These cases were
selected because they offer examples of successful and sustainable  governance reform for
community-driven  development, under quite different circumstances.  We then draw out
some of the generalizable lessons from these case studies, indicating reasons  for success or
failure.
Figure 1. State-community  alliances for development  and improved local public
service delivery
Central / State government
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32.  The State and the Community: reducing the potential for "local capture"
As many anthropological  and economic studies show, strong socio-economic
hierarchies seriously undermine the potential  for collective action for the common good
within communities, and increase the potential for "local capture" of benefits.  Societies
with considerable income  and asset inequalities are typically characterized by sharp
conflicts of interest between groups.  Quantitative analyses find that collective action works
better among people who are relatively equal and have similar needs and resources.8
However, moderate degrees of socio-economic differentiation can be less inimical to
collective  action. Relatively mild differentiation can actually be helpful by allowing scope
for local leadership,  as indicated in studies reviewed by Baland and Platteau (1999).9  We
describe  here how the dynamics of substantial inequalities within communities can hinder
collective action.
Patron-client relationships as constraints on collective action:
Patron-client relationships,  with their inter-linked contracts,  are a familiar feature of
many agrarian societies. The classic example of this is the patronage relationship between
landlords  and tenants, where a single contract has intertwined within it tenancy and credit
arrangements.' 0 Analyses of landlord-tenant  "labor-tying contracts" have shown how
richer, less risk-averse people can prey on the insecurity of the poor.  "
The crux of the matter is summarized  in Breman's (1974) succinct phrase "patronage
and exploitation":  flipsides of the same logic of exercising one's power as a landlord. For
the patron, such noblesse oblige enhances their social and economic power, while ensuring
their clients' continued survival and participation  in the relationship of vulnerable
dependence. Patrons seek to circumscribe  individual mobility among their clients, using if
necessary the threat of withdrawing insurance  and even physical force (Appendix  1).
Under such circumstances,  collective action is difficult to initiate. The elites will
perceive collective action by the poor as a threat to their hegemony,  and will strongly
discourage it. For their part, the poor are unlikely to want to engage in collective action for
fear that the elites will seek retribution or appropriate the gains.  The literature on South
8  For example, Banerjee and others  (2001) find that sugar cooperatives work less effectively in more
unequal communities,  and Bardhan (1999)  finds the same in the context of local cooperation for managing
irrigation systems.
9  See also Olson (1971).
10  See  for example  Braverman  and  Stiglitz  (1982),  Srinivasan  (1979),  Binswanger  and  Rosenzweig
(1984), Ghatak and Pandey (2000).
" For example  in West Bengal India, Bardhan and Rudra (1986) concluded that landowners take
advantage of the fact that security is the greatest need of the poor, they offer security in exchange for
considerable  amounts of foregone income and loss of freedom and autonomy.  Thus many people would not
go to work in a neighboring village despite higher wage rates, because they did not want to risk breakng
their ties with their patron.
4Asia is full of such examples'2, as also that on Latin America countries.'3 In many Latin
American  settings, the landowner-politician  nexus has been successful in resisting reforms
or in initiating counter-reforms,  and thereby defending their status.
Reducing inequalities through land reform and non-crop sources of  income:
Much can be done to mitigate  socio-political inequalities in rural areas, through land
reform and diversification into non-crop sources of income - opening up the possibility of
effective collective action within a community.  This can have enormous indirect impact
on growth and poverty alleviation,  far greater than the direct equity and efficiency gains of
land reform on which studies of land reform are typically focused, and for which the
empirical  evidence is somewhat mixed.1 4 Discussing the impact of land reform in South
Korea, Whang (1 981: 97-98) argues that the gains of land reform were strictly socio-
political:
(Land reform) helped to miniaturize  farm size ...  and in so doing helped the delay of
agricultural modernization in terms of productivity and mechanization....  (But it)
promoted egalitarianism  in rural communities.. .and thus facilitated the disappearance  of
class-consciousness between  landlords and tenants....  Thus, the land reform provided the
social and psychological  precondition  necessary for co-operation  among framers and that
m turn prepared  the way for the rural  innovation that was later ignited by the Saemaul
Undong.
Making social relations within the community more egalitarian was an essential
precondition to the imaginative  creation of state-community  synergies in South Korea,
Taiwan,  and China, as discussed below. Land reforms facilitated the growth of horizontal
developmental  associations within South Korean and Taiwanese communities,  as well as
in China when it opened up to a market economy. As mentioned above, Whang (1981)
emphasizes that the potential  for South Korea's rapid rural development was generated by
12 See references  in the two precedmg footnotes.
'3  See  for example  Deere  and  Leon  1997;  Hall  1994;  Kay and Silva  1992;  Prosterman et al.  1996;
Tannenbaum 1962; and Thiesenhusen  1995b.
14 Some studies have found strong evidence of productivity gams associated with giving sharecroppers
and small farmers  more secure rights over the land they cultivate.  This was found mn  analyses  of data from
Tunisia (Laffont and Matoussi  1995), Ghana (Besley  1995)  and China (Lin 1992).  In West Bengal state  of
India, increasing tenants' rights was associated  with 17-18%  average productivity gains (Banerjee and others
2001). In another study m India, Binswanger  and others (1993) concluded  that small farms are more
productive in settngs with little mechanization and slow technical change. Other studies, however, have
found inconclusive evidence of productivity  gams (Besley and Burgess  1998).
In some settings land reform has been carried out carefully enough to be effective in promoting equity
and reducing poverty.  Elsewhere, landowning elites have been successful  in resisting it through active links
with political elites and other evasion tactics. Examples include the counter-reforms  initiated in several Latin
American countries  (Kay and Silva 1992, Thiesenhusen  1995a,b).  Even where land has actually been
redistributed, it can benefit mostly the upper echelons of the rural poor,  increasing the gap between them and
the poorest - as in the Philippines (Hayanii, Quisumbing  and Lourdes  1990) and in some Latin American
countries (Thiesenhusen  1995a,b).
5the land reforns, enhanced further by equal access to primary schooling. A similar shift in
the political economy of intra-community  relationships following land reform is well
documented  in Taiwan's cooperative movement.  Cooperatives were established in Taiwan
under the Japanese, but they blossomed after the land reforms into much more active
developmental  organizations.  With government support, farmers'  organizations flourished,
helping peasants to pool their savings, improve irrigation and obtain new technologies,  and
over time develop rural industry (Ranis and Stewart  1993).
Radical  land reform is typically politically difficult to carry out, and these East Asian
countries were fortunate in the circumstances which facilitated it.15 Where such radical
land reform is difficult,  even strengthening tenants'  rights can help make local social and
political relationships more egalitarian.  Without undertaking the politically more
challenging task of altering legal ownership of land, this seeks to strengthen the bargaining
position of tenants vis-a-vis their landlords. It gives tenants greater security of tenure, and
often specifies lower ceilings on rents charged.  As studies in West Bengal indicate, even
this limited change can be effective  at empowering people within communities (Banerjee,
Gertler, and Ghatak 2001). However,  it requires considerable political commitmnent on the
part of the state, to overcome landlord resistance  as well as tenants'  fears of retribution
from landlords,16  as indicated in Kohli's description of West Bengal (1987:127-31):
In a local struggle involving inherently unequal social actors, sustained external  support
on the side of the underdog was essential to modify the power balance....The  local police
have moreover been instructed by the government at minimum to refrain from taking
sides with the landlords  and, at maximum,  to provide the bargadars with protection in
conflicts over crop-sharing and disputes over evictions. Wherever the landlords have
hired their own "thugs" to settle conflicts by force, the party has attempted to counter by
militant mobilization.
Similar changes can take place,  albeit more slowly, by widening access to
agricultural  inputs which increase  the productivity of small-holders (Appendix  1).
Given that large proportions of the rural poor in developing countries are landless or
nearly landless - and that per capita land availability is rapidly diminishing in poorer
regions of the world - it is important to look beyond land reform for ways to make the
rural poor less dependent on patrons. Key to this is creating more diversified sources of
rural income less dependant on owning land, such as livestock rearing and non-crop
activities. Disseminating information on such opportunities, providing access to necessary
15 These reforms were carried out after the Second World War in these countries.  In China, land reform
encountered little resistance given the context of sweeping revolution.  In Taiwan and South Korea, the threat
of Communist revolution provided a spur to land reform as a bulwark against Communism. The new regimes
owed little to pre-existing landowning elites. Taiwan came to be ruled by the Kuomintang  from mainland
China, with little need for support from local elites.  In South Korea, the new political leadership was
relatively unencumbered by existing political links, as it took root in the vacuum left by Japan and the chaos
of the Korean War. Moreover, the Korean landowning  class was deeply discredited by their perceived
collaboration  with Japanese colonists. Besides, the departing  Japanese colonialists left large tracts of land
vacant, available for the initial postwar round of land reform.
16 Kohli (1987); Boyce (1987).
6resources and marketing can all help greatiy in helping the poor diversify and increase their
sources of income.17 Help is required with obtaining credit, finding the appropriate inputs,
acquiring know-how about production and marketing,  ensuring quality control, and
reaching wider markets.
There is a great deal of evidence that non-crop incomes alleviate poverty in
developing countries while contributing to growth.'8 Since income shocks in the agrarian
and non-agrarian  sectors are often uncorrelated, non-crop incomes also reduce dependence
on patrons for help with tiding over income shocks. Expanding the potential for non-crop
incomes is also politically far less challenging than land reform or tenancy reform.
Broader  ramificationsfor  the community and  polity
In a multiplicity of ways, land reform and non-crop opportunities help reduce the
potential for local elite "capture",  and enable greater mobility in a community as a whole.
The most important gain of reducing local power imbalances is that they lay the basis for a
more inclusionary and developmental  polity. This has been extensively argued in studies of
India. Dreze  and Sen (1996) have pointed out that the potential for "capture" by local elites
is far higher in regions of India still characterized by deep socio-political  inequalities than
in more egalitarian regions.19 Banerjee and Iyer (2002) have shown that these inequalities
are associated with poorer economic and social development outcomes, in terms of
agricultural productivity, health and education.
Even if the poorest do not benefit directly from the new opportunities,  they can
benefit enormously indirectly from the social churning generated in the community.  The
newly-mobile beneficiaries may raise wage rates and hire more labour (Appendix 1), and
they take on more remunerative  opportunities and free up niches  for the landless. They
may benefit everyone by seeking greater accountability in the use of local development
funds and lobby to ensure that the community receives better public services.  The
community as a whole is better placed to provide the peer-evaluation  and peer-monitoring
required for key facilities such as credit co-operatives.
Even relatively meager levels of redistribution can produce powerful and long-
lasting changes. Studies of the Southern United States show that despite the very limited
and truncated efforts at giving land to Blacks during the 1870s:
... well into the twentieth century, blacks who did acquire land were more likely to
register, vote and run for office than other members of the rural community (Foner  1989:
109, cited in Herring  1999).
17This has been successful  in many contexts. Through a creative model of dairy co-operatives,  the
National Dairy Project in India has helped to significantly raise rural household incomes, including those of
the landless, marginal and small farmers . See  Candler and Kumar (1998) and Sampark (1997).
8 This is shown in many studies in Asia and Africa.  See,  for example, Lanjouw and Lanjouw (1995),
Newman and Canagarajah (2000);  and Eder (1993).
19 Harriss (1999)  argues that the regions of India in which traditional agrarian power structures have
been changed show better development  outcomes.
7Again, in the  1930s, landless black tenants who benefited from very limited land
distribution created ". ..a permanent middle class that ultimately emerged in the  1960s as
the backbone of the civil-rights movement in the rural South."20 From this discussion of
how the state can facilitate collective action at community level, we turn now to what the
state can do to create the conditions for effective  governance of community-driven
development.
3.  The State and local administrations: creating synergies  with communities
The modern state has enormous potential for providing the institutional support,
inputs and infrastructure necessary for upward mobility and for triggering local
development initiatives.  These case studies illustrate how effective  alliances can  be
formed between  higher levels of government and communities, to elicit better service
delivery from local agencies (Figure 1). This requires careful design of bureaucratic
organizations and staff incentives for perforrnance:  a large question that has received
considerable attention,2'  and care to avoid "local capture."  We also focus on the relatively
neglected area of the incentives of grassroots level staff, who form the direct interface
between communities and the state. Here, too, creative mixing of local and supra-local
strengths can be highly productive.
We begin by illustrating some key obstacles to performance by grassroots level staff
and how they can be averted, drawing on Wade's (1982,  1997) comparison of South
Korean and Indian irrigation agencies.  This is followed by case studies of redesign of local
agency incentives, both more successful and less successful.  Section Ell draws out the
lessons from these case studies, about the key ingredients for success in generating these
state-community synergies.
The importance  of agency incentives and design: illustrations  from Indian and South
Korean canal irrigation  systems
Several case-studies illustrate how service delivery improves if the highly
complementary strengths of communities and the state are blended:  using local strengths in
information and monitoring capacity to complement technical and other inputs from higher
22 levels of government.  One study which has been especially carefully developed  and
20 Salamon (1979:129),  cited in Herring (1999).
21 See for examnple Manor (1999) and Bardhan (1997).
22 For examnple,  the school program in Himachal Pradesh in India blended the technical skills of higher
levels of govermment in designing curricula and textbooks, with community-level monitoring of school
(Probe Team 1999).  Similarly,  the highly successful program to eradicate river blindness in Sub-Saharan
Africa combined the logistical strengths of the state for aerial spraying, and with those of communities  for
managing smooth distribution of drugs through civil wars and other cnses (World Bank 2000a).
For less complex tasks, bottom-up collective action is also very powerful, as Hirshman (1 984a,b) has
illustrated through empirical examples from Latin Amenca.  See also Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne (1993),
Owen and van Domelen (1998), Barnentos (1999), and World Bank (2000a,b).
8documented is Wade's comparison of the canal irrigation systems of South Korea and
Andhra Pradesh state in South India.
In the South Korean canal irrigation system, broad policy was developed at high
levels of government,  canal construction was managed by technical experts,  and routine
operation and maintenance  carried out by people with strong stakes in the end-user
community.  The professional staff must belong to the same county as the end-users,  and
the actual patrollers are part-time staff who must also be rooted as farmers in the
communities they serve. The patrollers, whose job it is to control the water flow and to do
small-scale maintenance, are selected by the chiefs of the villages in their jurisdiction  and
must be re-nominated by them each year. When necessary, patrollers can draw on the
technical and other support of the large organizational  structure above them.
As a result, local management of the South Korean canal irrigation system is done by
associations with strong links to the state as well as the end-user communities. Moreover,
staff salaries and their operational budget derive partly from the water charges collected.
There are thus multiple incentives for a South Korean canal patroller to perform well. He
has an interest  in obtaining irrigation water himself, in avoiding sanctions from his own
community, and in ensuring his continued employment. Not subject to transfer, he and his
colleagues in the irrigation department  are also able to develop strong working
relationships and exert peer pressure on each other.
By contrast,  the Indian system is carefully designed to minimize the scope for
collusion between irrigation staff and the farmers who actually use the canal water. The
canal patroller must be a full-time employee and cannot farm more than a marginal amount
of land. He must not be posted in the jurisdiction in which his native village is located,  and
must be rotated between posts within six years. His salary derives from the departmental
budget,  and thus unrelated to water-use.  He is recruited by the irrigation department, and
after a probationary period his post in made permanent. His incentives are furthered
reduced by a virtual absence of promotion opportunities, even though he is expected to
spend his life as a full-time employee of the department.
The work of Indian canal staff is hampered by an elaborate system of checks and
balances which separate control of funds from those who need to expend them.  For
example, if the canal develops a significant breach and labor needs to be hired to repair it,
neither the foreman nor the assistant engineer is authorized to undertake the expenditure
without the permission of the executive engineer, who is often not contactable at short
notice. As a result "most assistant engineers are inclined to play it safe, allowing the breach
to deteriorate  until they can contact their superior" (Wade  1997:  124).  Designed to avert
corruption,  these mechanisms  have the resulting effect of discouraging initiative,  and are
counter-productive.
Distanced from their clients and hampered from effective performance, the Indian
canal patrollers have little positive reinforcement from client feedback or their own sense
of  job satisfaction. Meanwhile, their bureaucratic  superiors have their own problems to
deal with. Inadequately protected from political pressures, they are faced with arbitrary and
9unwelcome transfers if they displease their political bosses.  As Wade (1985) puts it
"Frequently,  the pressures on officials to be corrupt cause them to behave in ways contrary
to the ostensible objectives of their departments." These concerns  also reduce their
responsiveness to requests or alerts from their junior staff,  further reducing the latter's
incentive to perform.
Thus, in sharp contrast to their South Korean counterparts,  Indian canal patrollers
have little incentive to perform and little opportunity to develop the good working
relationships necessary for good performance.  These two case studies highlight the need to
ensure that staff at every level have the right performance incentives,  and the authority
required for getting their job done. The Indian government's approach to discouraging
corruption  actually hampered service delivery and the agencies'  responsiveness to the
needs of end-users.
Case studies of  successful efforts to re-organize local government agencies
Success has been achieved in very different political and administrative  settings, in
bringing about innovative institutional re-organization  and fostering state-community
alliances for development,  averting problems of "local capture."  Encouragingly,  these case
studies show that such institutional change can be achieved quite rapidly,  given strong
political will.23 For example, the above description might suggest that South Korean local
government had a long history of good development outreach. Yet, the basic structure that
Wade describes was put into place in the early  1  960s, less than two decades before his
study.
South Korea.  Altering the organization and values of local administrative  institutions
in South Korea required considerable  creative organization on the part of the state:
Historically, local governments  in Korea have been instruments of the central
government  in charge of controlling  local resources, and oriented to law and order.
Support of rural development for meeting development needs of rural communities
seemed to be a new concept to them... .The organization of local governments has been
restructured to introduce  a functional  transformation from control and regulation to
development  support administration.  (Whang  1981:  17).
In the 1970s, the South Korean government  also undertook a program of rapid
community development, the Saemaul Undong (Whang 1981,  Wade  1982). The idea was
to galvanize communities  into upgrading their own living conditions, while also
incorporating them into the central structure of the state. Through wide information-
dissemination and propaganda about the prograrn, people were informed about the benefits
of the program and encouraged  to support it. This was combined at the local level with
more direct exhortation and some coercion, reinforced by organized competition whereby
more successful communities were rewarded by being allocated more resources by the
23  Simnilar but less dramatic examples of successful generation of state-community linkages for
development  are to be found in other settings, including in Indonesia  and Vietnam (Ranis and Stewart 1993,
Evans  1996).
10state. Community leaders were trained and local officials encouraged to provide back-up
and technical  support as required.  They were also encouraged to interact in many fora with
higher officials, such that they could spontaneously develop new ideas and avenues of co-
operation:
... the organizational  channels provided for Saemaul leaders greatly encouraged the
participation of village leadership in the decision-making processes both at the township
and county levels. Indeed, a few Saemaul leaders worked as members with the Saemaul
Consultation  Committee at both township and county levels... .(They were also) given the
prnvilege to freely meet with the county-chief or governor if they wanted to do so.
(Whang  1981: 96).
The results were to improve villages along a wide range of dimensions.  Village
infrastructure  was extensively constructed  and upgraded: including roads, water systems,
bridges, small-scale irrigation, and electrification.  A variety of income-generating projects
and savings programs were initiated. Community and domestic hygiene were greatly
improved through various measures,  such as better cattle housing and improved water
management. Moreover,  the costs were borne largely by the communities themselves: the
response was so enthusiastic that communities contributed around 70% of the total
resources required for these projects (Whang 1981:  15).
Clearly a community development initiative trying to upgrade living conditions
required the active participation of women. In a sharp break from traditional constraints to
women's participation in public life, this was encouraged (Whang 1981:  106-10). Women
were obliged to participate with men in the village general assembly. The women
responded with alacrity.  to this new opportunity, becoming a driving force of change:
The members of Saemaul Women's Association  mitiated a campaign for burning up the
cards with which their husbands gambled during the off-season.  (They) also organized a
campaign  for closing down the liquor stores within their villages where their husbands
used to dnnk and thus add more hardship to their pains of poverty-stncken  housekeeping.
The women's associations  undertook many activities to improve their families' lives.
They operated a small savings project which evolved into a "mothers'  bank" with a small
revolving credit union. Income-generating  activities included running village cooperative
stores and collecting waste for sale. Through a village kitchen project, they organized
collective cooking in the busy season, and also taught ways of improving family nutrition.
China. This model of developing a dense network of ties between communities and
local administrations also underlies the stunning growth of township and village
enterprises (TVEs) in China during the 1980s  and  1990s.24 For various reasons, including
a desire to reduce rural-urban migration, the central government took steps to favor
industrial development in rural areas, by allowing local communities to organize their own
enterprises.  Community leaders are elected by the community,  but are affirmed by higher
24 See, for example, Pei (1996), Johnson (1991), Oi (1999), Du (1990). The growth of TVEs is slowing
down now, as problems of conimunal ownership of enterprises become more apparent.
11authorities and function as members both of the state administrative hierarchies as well as
of their own villages.  Through their ties with the administration,  community leaders obtain
information on economic opportunities  as well as help with accessing the credit and other
resources for realizing these opportunities.
The...  .difference between  governments of township and villages and governments above
township level is that most officials of township and village governments  are at the  same
time members of collective organizations,  and are, therefore,  also owners  of
TVEs....village officials can be considered  as having double identities; they are members
both of China's administrative  hierarchy and of their own villages. (Pei 1996: 45-61)
Collective action is greatly facilitated in Chinese communities by tightly knit kinship
ties and local loyalties, within which framework people are accustomed to co-operating for
mutual benefit.25 Community sanctions are used effectively in this system:
The characteristics of local governments are also rooted  in the organization of Chma's
rural communities....because  of the low information costs of the social group and the
geographic immobility of village officials, the cost of choosing and the cost of evaluating
performance  are very low.
The official  cannot make a continued return for himself alone from (his administrative
position).  Should he try to do so, hls highly valued reputation and its interrelated benefits
will be lost. So it is in the official's own long-term interests not to jeopardize them. Thus,
the benefits of village officials must be realized through profit maximization of the
village coalition.  (Pei 1996: 45-61).
The potential for using these longstanding social institutions could, however, only
be realized after crucial changes in financial incentives.  Before the market reforms,
communities had little incentive to increase output, as the state would appropriate the
surplus. The system of taxation now varies between settings, but a common practice is for
taxes to be fixed in advance (Qian and Weingast  1996). Any income beyond that is shared
by the community and officials, giving both a big stake in the success of the enterprise. At
the same time, the state does not provide bailouts: the community faces hard budget
constraints and if they cannot make the enterprise work successfully, they stand to bear the
full loss. Their continued reliance on agriculture helps cushion them against industrial
setbacks, as well as providing a source of capital for investment.
Taiwan.  In Taiwan, efforts to build active collaboration  between the state and
communities helped to simultaneously develop agriculture and rural industry. Following
land reform,  and with the need for fast and strong development successes  to ensure the
country's viability, the Taiwanese government stimulated rural communities  to rapidly
develop its agrarian economy.  This is succinctly described in Fei, Ranis and Kuo (1979:
37-71)":
25 See, for example, Johnson (1991).  This is greatly aided by the systematic cultural homogenization of
the Chinese into membership of the dominant Han group.
26 See also Amsden (1985).
12The farmers'  associations and credit cooperatives,  set up by the Japanese to facilitate
agricultural extension programs and nce procurement, were top-down institutions
dominated by landlords and nonfarmers.  As a result, most farmers did not directly benefit
from them. In  1952 government  consolidated those institutions in multipurpose  farmers'
associations restricted to farmers and serving their interests. In addition to the original
function of agricultural extension, the activities of farmers'  associations expanded to
include a credit department, which accepted deposits from farmers and made loans to
them, and to provide facilities for purchasmg,  marketing,  warehousing, and processing.
The associations thus became clearnghouses  for farmers, who controlled and maintained
them and viewed them as their own creatures.
With skilful adaptation, these associations were also used to engender rapid growth
of industrial production based in rural areas (Fei, Ranis, and Kuo  1981). Nor was this
constrained by the relatively small volume of internal demand for industrial goods: the
state made available the necessary information  and other organizational support to enable
rural industry to produce for the international market. Farmers'  associations were expanded
to include new functions - forming part of an organizational  framework for providing
important support activities for production and exchange processes,  such as input supplies,
quality control, warehousing,  and marketing.  In some ways, these associations were used
to parallel the roles played by larger trading companies in Japan and the Republic of
Korea.
Brazil. In Ceara, northeast Brazil, Tendler (1997) describes how the state tried to
overcome problems in service delivery by forming an alliance with local workers and
communities.  It thereby brought pressure on local municipalities  from above and below, to
improve their performance in areas such as public health, agricultural extension, drought
relief and building infrastructure  such as schools.  This had two major prongs: increasing
the accountability of frontline workers,  and making finances available directly to
communities.
The state recruited and trained a fresh cadre of grassroots workers to provide these
services, and motivated them highly by publicizing their work and offering much official
recognition for their services:
Simply by virtue of working in these programs, they were told, they stood above the rest
as leaders, and this placed a special burden on them to behave responsibly.  All this
contributed to a new respect for these workers by the public --- remarkable  in a time of
widespread contempt for government.  (Tendler 1997:  136).
Budgetary allocations were made available directly to communities to enhance
ownership and accountability, with technical support where necessary:
... the school maintenance  and repair program drew neighborhood associations into the
process of selecting small contractors.  And to enable these associations to informally
monitor the repair and reconstruction work, agency technicians instructed them in some
basic procedures that contractors should be following, like the proper preparation of wall
surfaces for receiving  tiles. (Tendler 1997:140).
13A publicity blitz served as a multi-pronged weapon in this strategy. It helped
reinforce respect for the workers. At the same time, it encouraged people to have high
expectations of the program and hold workers accountable for their performance.  It also
inforned people of what services they should receive, so that they could pressurize local
government to provide them if the services were not forthcoming.  This publicity campaign
helped galvanize communities  into collective action to improve their public goods and
services.
Multi-tasking was an important feature  of these grassroots workers' job, and this
made their services much more attractive to clients. Public health paraprofessionals'
primary task was preventive care, but they were also authorized to provide some simple
curative care, normally the monopoly of nurses and doctors. Agricultural  extension agents
were authorized to provide drought relief and to supervise small construction projects in
the drought relief program, which is normally the job of engineers and supervisors.  Instead
of delivering standardized messages about improving farming, these extension workers
were encouraged to tackle various problems raised by farmers, including matters such as
getting access to an unsympathetic bank.
This seeming jumble of tasks, sometimes involving more brokering than expertise,
cohered together in a client-centric,  problem-solving  approach to service delivery. It gave
rise to trusting and respectful relationships  between clients and public servants... .(Tendler
1997:  138).
Lacking the prior extensive land reform of East Asian countries, the state had to
tackle problems of landlord interests and their political connections with local government.
This created problems,  for example,  in providing drought relief: "the drought relief
programs benefited the region's large landowners, private contractors and suppliers of
relief more than those needing jobs, food and water" (Tendler  1997: 49). In the 1987
drought, agricultural extension workers were used to break the grip of patronage  in the
distribution of drought relief  However,  sustaining such successes requires much
continuing effort, and at least in the early 1990s the powerful vested interests managed to
re-introduce some clientelism in drought relief.
As Tendler points out, the Brazilian case shows that the government can be a strong
moral force in the realm of public service, and it can use this force to get citizens to
monitor its workers and help protect them from meddling by local politicians and other
powerful interest groups. Dedicated workers needed protection from others, including rent-
seeking co-workers, superiors and elected officials, and showed much appreciation for
receiving this protection.  The state's government was less likely to respond to the demands
expressed along localized socio-economic  divisions and therefore a better ally of
community development projects. All the more so that having services delivered at the
local level and being able to claim this success as its own was in the state's political
interest.
As this model was extended to broader areas of development in Brazil, local political
interference has been kept at bay by the state governments'  insistence that municipal-level
14councils for disbursing development funds have at least 80% representation  from end-user
communities (World Bank 1997). Moreover,  if communities feel they are unfairly treated
by the municipal councils, they can by-pass them to apply for funds directly from the state
government.  Gradually, these councils have  gained experience and an estimated one-third
of them have begun to actively monitor other municipal activities (Coirolo 2000).
Less successful cases
Mexico: the absence of sustained  state support. The Mexican PIDER program,
initiated by the federal government in 1973, was a large investment program for the
implementation of small-scale,  local projects in some of the poorest areas in the country.
Small-scale irrigation, soil conservation, fruit-trees plantations, rural roads, fishponds, live
stocks units, rural health points, schools, potable water systems, village electrification were
the types of activities financed under the program.  In order to be able to implement all
these small-scales operations,  emphasis was put early on in the process towards
"promoting, postulating and organizing participation" (Cernea  1983).
In describing how this program operated in the state of Nayarit, Fox (1992) says that
it was initially very successful, with a dynamic team of community organizers bringing
leaders from several agrarian communities  together for the first time.27 The team raised
awareness  among peasants of the losses they sustained due to tied-markets and rent-
seeking bureaucrats.  The peasants mobilized successfully to obtain better access to credit
and cheaper fertilizers, by putting pressure on the state's governor, the branch manager of
the official agricultural bank, and the government's  fertilizer agency.
Following their early successes in asserting their rights, communities joined together
and founded a Union in 1975 (UELC, Lazaro Cardenas' Union of Ejidos). However,  in
1976, the presidency changed hands and reformists lost power, depriving the movement  of
its federal allies. It became easy for the state governor to subvert the movement. The
movement had been too short-lived  to create a sustainable force that could stand up alone
-without  federal support - against the interests of powerful local authorities.
The Philippines:  the impact ofpowerful landed interests. Efforts at institutional
reform in the Philippines  illustrate the problems of initiating reforms where powerful
landed interests are at play and the society is riven by wealth disparities. Despite their
efforts to centralize power, successive governments have needed the cooperation of the
landlords to function (IRIS 2000).  In this situation, the rush to organize mayoral elections
in the Philippines  after the war, before constructing local bureaucratic agencies, resulted in
the mayors creating their own nepotistic bureaucracies and "creating a system of local
bossism which survives to this day" (Manor  1999: 59).
27 Mexican agrarian reform communities, the ejidos, are institutions to which the government cedes land
uses rights. They are corporatist institutions , whlch take decisions through democratic mass membership
assemblies,  but govermnent officials supervise and often intervene in internal  elections. Ejidos can from
regional unions to collaborate on agricultural development projects.
15Rural landlords and urban bosses, acting as local power brokers with substantial
control over local coercive and economic resources,  developed  at each electoral level:
municipalities,  congressional districts,  and provinces (Carino  1998;  Sidel 1996,  1997).
"Elected officials enjoyed enornous discretion over the emerging State apparatus.
Combined with ...  the expanding economic role of the state with import-substitution
industrialization after the Second World War, it allowed bosses to construct personal
fiefdoms and retain control over the state apparatus"  (Carino  1998).
This was displaced by more centralized bossism during Marcos'  regime (1966-85),
but has re-emerged after his fall:
The new local government code has restored - and indeed strengthened- the prerogatives
of municipal mayors and provincial  governors over local agencies and resources  of the
state apparatus. Given the manifold spoils of these multitudinous  offices, elections have
been fiercely contested, through machine mobilization,  vote buying,  fraud, manipulation
and violence (Sidel  1996).
Here mechanisms of monitoring and accountability were not in place to ensure that
the benefits of the institutional re-organization of local government were not "captured" by
a few. Reforms towards democratic decentralization,  including the involvement of local
NGOs in decision-making  at the local level, have not been sufficient to counteract rent-
seeking tendencies of local bosses and entrenched bureaucracies.  Some efforts have been
made at land reform (Hayami,  Quisumbing and Lourdes  1990), which may gradually help
pave the way for more effective community-level development.
4.  Lessons from these case studies
The successful case studies illustrate how government efforts at redesigning the
institutional structures of governance  altered the incentives and the abilities of local
agencies and communities to deliver public goods and to undertake new kinds of
development initiatives. In Brazil, the government  formed an alliance with local
communities  to improve the performance of the municipalities  in diverse areas like public
health, primary education and agricultural extension.  In the Republic of Korea,  the
government's  efforts through community development programs improved  development
and maintenance of both the physical and social infrastructure of the village communities.
In Taiwan, the remarkable achievements  in the sphere of rural development and industrial
growth were achieved mainly through the activities of the multi-purpose farmers'
associations promoted by the government  in the early 1950s. In China, fiscal
decentralization and granting of autonomy to local bodies helped create the basis for the
remarkable  achievements of township and village enterprises (TVEs).
The close and multi-faceted collaboration between the apparatus of the state and
community leaders becamne an important factor in these countries'  economic development
in recent years. Elsewhere, efforts were less successful. In the Philippines, the nexus of
relationships between government officials and powerful landowners formed an obstacle to
16program success.  In Mexico, initial successes tapered off because of lack of sustained
political support.
There are several useful lessons to be drawn  from these case studies.  Some of the
key ingredients for success are summarized here.
Close links between the state and communities, tapping  into informal community
institutions
In all these settings, efforts were made to build dense networks of interaction
between higher echelons of government,  local officials and community leaders - to make
available to communities the necessary  support with information, technical inputs,
marketing,  credit etc. needed to implement their own programs of social and economic
development.  In South Korea, China,  and Taiwan, local leaders and officials had
overlapping roles as simultaneously members of the community served and of the lowest
tier of state administration.  In Brazil, grassroots workers were not necessarily members of
the community they serve, but were encouraged to develop close links with them. Through
these dense networks of interaction,  the state and communities were enabled to collaborate
in development.
The success of the model depends on productive convergence  of interest between
community members, field outreach staff,  and local officials, as well as with successive
echelons of the state administration.  Through cultivating these networks, people could
access more resources to help their communities prosper. The trick is to ensure that
mechanisms of local accountability ensure that the benefits accrue to  a wide section of the
community (see Pei 1996 quotation above).
In all these cases,  and particularly in East Asia, the states built on local institutions,
using local idioms to build their networks of collaboration. -Small-scale communities
already have the dense network of ties of co-operation necessary for this purpose, and the
state channeled these strengths to contribute to development  goals. When these states
decided to accelerate the pace of development,  they were creative in tapping into existing
local informal institutional structures - ignored by previous governments - and setting
their norms of reciprocity,  co-operation and trust to work to achieve development goals.
The Brazilian example  is of especial interest in this context. It shows that it is
possible to achieve these ends even in settings without the strong clan and kinship ties
characterizing rural East Asian communities.28 Even in less tightly knit communities,
people will engage in collective action for common goals if they are given the opportunity
and the required information.29
28 The strength of African communities,  evidenced by their response to the availability of social  funds
and other communmty-based  funds, could also be an asset to develop  similar reforms in this continent (World
Bank 2000c).
29 And the strength of African comrnunities,  evidenced by their response to the availability  of social
funds and other conmmunity-based funds, could also be an asset to develop  simiilar reforms (World Bank
2000c).
17Changing  local and supra-local  agencies'  mode of  operation
To make the most of the potential advantages of community participation in public
service delivery, it is important to ensure that the mode of operation of local government
agencies is such as to draw on local information and monitoring capacity. This requires
careful attention to bureaucratic design and staff performance incentives.30 In many
settings, local administrations  are designed to be "instruments of the central government in
change of controlling local resources,  and oriented to law and order."3'  Not only do they
have little accountability to the people they serve, but sometimes (as illustrated above) the
system is specifically designed to minimize interchange between communities and local
administration,  in order to reduce opportunities for corruption.
Local agencies are naturally reluctant to accept demands for greater accountability,
especially to clients over whom they are often accustomed  to exercising considerable
power.  Besides, they develop work cultures which are difficult to shake.  Officials can
become quite adapted to working environments that offer few performance  incentives, but
that do offer them the benefits of status as the officials who must be petitioned by their
clients. They can become accustomed to low work demands and to supplementing
inadequate incomes with bribes and payoffs.
To improve local agencies' performance,  states orchestrated pressure on them from
above as well as from the clients below (Figure  1),  to motivate them into working
collaboratively with communities.  The modalities of pressure from above varied widely,
depending on the country's political and administrative resources. South Korea's military
government usedfiat to forcefully prescribe bureaucratic  reform, while leaving
considerable latitude for local initiative in service delivery.  (Even so, officials tried to
evade greater accountability,  for example by hiding the complaints box behind a screen).32
Post-reform China used financial incentives,  giving local governments a stake in the profits
of community enterprises. In Northeast  Brazil, the state used official job recognition to
motivate staff. Pressure from below was orchestrated in all cases by getting communities
to expect and demand better services.
At the same time, there is a real risk of encroachment of the center on local
administrations, which can potentially impede their functioning as strong entities.
Accountability mechanisms are important, but these have to be structured such as to permit
and facilitate the development of local administrative  and governmental capacities.
Also critical to the success of the enterprise was adjusting the roles of higher levels
of government.  Through creative management, work habits and perceptions of roles were
altered amongst higher levels of bureaucracy. They were encouraged to shift away from
'0 This is a large question that has received considerable attention.  See for example Bardhan (2000),
Crook and Manor (1994),  and Manor (1999).
3'  Whang (1981), describing local govermment in South Korea in the early 1960s.
3Z Wade (1997).
18monitoring and co-ordinating  outreach services, to focus more on the specialized tasks of
managing overall strategy, providing technical  support, and regulation and facilitation.
Enhancing  the incentives of  grassroots level workers and their accountability  to
communities
A variety of rewards and sanctions were used to elicit good job performance  from
frontline workers. In South Korea and China, a major incentive for good performance was
built in by drawing the lowest echelon of workers from within the communities themselves
- creating strong potential sanctions for non-performance  as the workers  had a long-run
interest in good relations with their community.  They also gained personally from good
service delivery (e.g.,  successful irrigation or enterprises),  along with the rest of their
community.  Another effective  strategy was having their salary and/or job renewal
dependent on community opinion.  Where workers could be outsiders,  as in Brazil,
communities were exhorted to monitor their workers.  To keep workers motivated,
communities were encouraged to show their respect and appreciation of good workers, and
official recognition was also given.
Giving grassroots workers the flexibility to do their work properly was important, as
also giving them the scope to multi-task such that they could meet client needs more
effectively.  This also provided positive reinforcement for workers. For example, if
irrigation workers or drought relief staff can also provide agricultural  extension, they are
able to derive more status and satisfaction from being able to help their clients.
A key aspect of grassroots workers' jobs in all these case studies was that they were
expected not merely to deliver a specific service, but to act as brokers  between the
community and the wider world. Being more in touch with state facilities as well as those
of the outside world, they were expected to help their clients expand their access to
resources and help them negotiate their way through unfamiliar procedures.  This is very
important to people deprived of information,  and in the absence of adequate state outreach
they are forced to depend for such services on potentially exploitative patrons  and
middlemen.33
33 Note that instead of discouraging  collusion, this model actually encourages collusion and channels it
mto forms which can be productive for the common good (Baumol  1990). The success of the model depends
on productive  collusion between conmmunity members and their leaders,  and between these leaders and local
officials as well  as with successive  echelons of the state administration.  Local accountability can help
forestall an appropriation of gains by the leaders and officials alone, as Pei (1996) emphasizes in his
discussion of China:
The official cannot make a continued return for himself alone from (his administrative position).
Should he try to do so, his highly-valued reputation and its interrelated benefits  will be lost. So it is in
the official's own long-term interests  not to jeopardize them. Thus, the benefits of village officials
must be realized through profit maximization of the village coalition. (parentheses ours).
19Generating  community demandfor better  public goods and services
Generating demand for grassroots services was  a crucial component of successful
community engagement.  Through wide information dissemination,  people were made
aware of what services should be available to them, so that they would pressure the staff of
their local agencies to provide them. This is crucial for informing communities of new
opportunities and of new rights:
... the proclamation  of a right (is) if not automatically  self-fulfilling, at least the first step
to any serious attempt to secure that right (Hirschman 1  984a: 9).
Moreover,  aspirations were systematically raised to create additional demand for
services. For example, South Korea used organized competition between villages to
generate demand for upgrading village facilities, where if left alone people's aspirations
would not have risen so quickly.  In the other settings too, information was actively
disseminated on new opportunities  in order to motivate clients into demanding  and using
services more actively and increase the pace of development.
Financial, technical  and other support to communities
These case studies illustrate a range of ways in which financial, technical  and other
support can be channeled to communities. Fiscal decentralization can be used creatively to
promote accountability and ownership.  Financial inputs can be offered to help meet
specific needs, such as for repairing schools in Brazil.  Financial incentives  can be used as
a way of channeling communities'  interests towards new areas, as was done in the
Republic of Korea by setting up competitions to see which village was most successful  in
its Saemaul Undong activities.
Similarly, many forms of technical support were effectively used.  In Brazil,
technical training was given to enable communities to maintain school buildings.  In
Taiwan and China, technical  support extended to helping identify products, markets,
production techniques etc., to help local communities produce both agricultural  and
industrial goods for a wide market.  This was done in the context of decentralized decision-
making, allowing communities  to organize their own enterprises.
Sustained  political  backing  for reforms, and payoffs for the state
It is important to note that these cases do not bear out some fears commonly
associated with "going directly to communities."  Firstly, higher  levels of  government did
not lose power as a result of these changes,  and their new roles offered greater scope for
using professional expertise than before.  Secondly, governments were not weakened by the
process. Instead of being undermined, potentially weak governments were strengthened
through this process. Communities were brought into direct contact with the central
structure of the state. Governments  were able to inculcate loyalty to the regime during the
elaborate training of community workers in central locations.
20These initiatives had substantial  political  payoffs. Politicians in democracies  found
an effective way of gaining votes, and quickly learned to adapt their electoral strategies
towards offering people visible gains and empowerment. For example,  in a municipal
election in Brazil, candidates emphasized that they would have to support the new
arrangements  in order to be elected (Coirolo 2000).  Authoritarian  regimes gained
legitimacy  for their attention to their citizens'  welfare. At the same time, the conditions
were strengthened for a plural polity.
Whether or not the center's primary motivation was ideological and developmental,
well-understood immediate political interests have been a powerful driving force to
mobilize communities and improve service deliveries.  The lessons from the less successful
efforts in the Philippines  and Mexico  illustrate that it is crucial for politicians to understand
that this is a "win-win" strategy for them and their citizenry - and of sticking with the
strategy through changes in administration.
Caveats. While the above case studies show how much can be achieved through
engaging communities, they also show that this process requires careful planning and
active management.  As Abraham  and Platteau (forthcoming, 2002), Tendler (2000) and
others have pointed out, there are serious dangers in seeking quick solutions from
decentralizing powers to communities.  These ideas need to be developed with careful
thought to the outcomes sought and the nature of the communities involved. Platteau
(2000) summarizes some of the potentially fatal oversights commonly made when people
are in a hurry for a quick fix:
*  Informal community institutions and procedures can need adapting if they are
required to be used for new purposes. Additional skills may also be needed, such as
in maintaining accounts
*  Certain situations may require complementary interventions by the state, for example
to offset dominance by local elites. By merely-devolving power and finances to
communities with highly skewed power structures, the stage is set for "local
capture."
*  Similarly, poor outcomes are also likely if prominent community members or NGOs
are used to channel resources, without extensive efforts to disseminate information to
and generate  demand among the whole community about the expected products.
The careful devising of ways to avoid "elite capture" in Brazil and the careful choice
of development objectives to avoid areas most vulnerable to such capture34 is in sharp
contrast to that pertaining in many development projects.35 What the case studies discussed
here illustrate  is that central agencies have an important role to play in managing the
process of decentralization.  As Platteau (2001) summarizes  it:
Brazil's success in decentralization of public service ...  is that "it had at its core a strong
and new role played by central government"  (Tendler  1997: 73).  ... The (state)
government 'kept an iron hand'  on some crucial components of the decentralized
34 Tendler (1997), World Bank (1997), Coirolo (2000).
35 Tendler (2000), Platteau (2000), Abraham and Platteau (2002).
21programs to substantially reduce the opportunities  for mayors and local power-holders
(especially large landowners)  to exercise patronage.
5.  Discussion
We analyze country experiences to examine the conditions required  to tap the
enormous potential of local energies  and resources for community-level  development.  At
the level of the community,  this requires broadening the distribution of power to avert local
capture  and facilitate collective action. At the level of the state, much can be achieved by
creating alliances between higher levels of government  and communities, to provide
incentives  for local administration to collaborate with local communities and thereby
improve public service delivery.
We argue that land reform, tenancy reform and expansion of non-crop opportunities
have powerful benefits for development by releasing people's energies for upward
mobility-  energies that are otherwise suppressed by fear that patrons will oppose them or
capture the benefits.  With greater intra-community equality, there is less of a trade-off
between using comrnunities'  advantages in local information, and elite capture.  In turn,
this helps build a more developmental polity and society.
We also argue that higher levels of government can form alliances with communities
to catalyze institutional  change at the local level, in quite diverse settings. Through these
alliances, they can increase the incentives  and scope for local public agencies and
communities to collaborate, creating powerful coalitions and developmental  synergies with
a potentially self-sustaining dynamic.  Moreover, there are successful examples both in
settings with democratic processes  (where elected community representatives  constituted
the lowest echelon of the bureaucracy),  as well as in others where community
organizations  function independently of these processes.
In the East Asian settings,  these institutional changes encountered little resistance
from local elites and government officials, because at the time people were anxious to
recover from the devastation of war and prepared to accept radical changes from the
authoritarian regimes governing them. Also, for historical and ideological  reasons it was
relatively easy to push through radical land reforms and generate more egalitarian and
developmentally oriented local communities.
Given that most developing countries today face very different circumstances  from
Brazil, the Brazilian case is especially noteworthy.  It shows that with some creative
political thinking it is possible to effect rapid change even in inegalitarian institutional
settings  subject to "local elite capture." It illustrates the additional efforts required from the
state to gradually overcome these obstacles, by carefully designing changes which bring
grassroots electoral pressure to bear on local government and reduce  "local capture" by
elites.
This model has proved to be very successful in achieving  a wide range of outcomes,
ranging from health and drought relief to generating agrarian and industrial  economic
22growth. As evidenced by China and Taiwan, state-community synergies can catalyze the
expansion of secondary sector production in rural and semi-rural areas, thereby raising
local incomes and catering not only to local consumption, but also to a rich export market
for secondary sector products.
These case studies also indicate that states, both authoritarian and democratic, have
much to gain in legitimacy and popularity from initiating these institutional changes - if
only they have the insight to realize that this is a more effective and sustainable way of
gaining popular support than routine political machinations.  At the same time, the example
of Mexico shows how fragile  such efforts can be if political support  from above is
prematurely withdrawn.
As these studies show, building these state-community synergies requires careful
channeling of community strengths, demand creation,  and management of incentives for
everyone concemed:  communities, frontline workers,  local agencies  and supra-local
agencies. The process  depends on strong and sustained political backing. Moreover,  careful
choices need to be made regarding areas of action - while many kinds of development
initiative benefit from decentralization  and community engagement,  others do not.  For
example in the field of public health, managing most aspects of environmental sanitation is
best done at grassroots  level where the problems are easily identified, but programs such as
immunization  are often most successful when they are centralized. 36 This paper provides
some initial insights into these processes, which deserve systematic consideration if the




Breaking the power of landowning  elites through development  programs: a case
study from Uttar Pradesh, India
The socioeconomic  hierarchy of the village is apparent even before the bus arrives at
the village: there is one large brick whitewashed mansion,  standing out among a sea of
mud huts. The mansion is the home of the talukdar  family, the erstwhile large landowner
whose duty it was to collect land revenues  for the colonial power. They lost some of their
holdings when land ceilings were imposed in the 1950s, although they evaded much of this
through fictitious division.
For the next couple of decades, the talukdars consolidated their relationships with the
new power structures of the state. In a typical pattern of diversifying family networks, the
father arranged for one son to be in the police service, while another managed the land.
They continued to be the critical source of credit and employment for the villagers, and
their overwhelming social superiority was acknowledged by the villagers as they prefaced
every interaction with the greeting "Touching your feet, Lord..."
For this family, well-educated  and well-connected,  it was easy to divert development
funds to their own benefit and the other villagers would typically not even come to know
of the entitlements of which they were being deprived. Even if they did come to know of it,
they could hardly protest about it when the talukdars had guns and were known to rape and
maim at will.
In the mid-1970s, information on tubewells reached some middle-level  peasants,
who pooled resources to sink a tubewell to irrigate their contiguous plots. Eager to
maximize their profits, they began to sow cash crops and raised the wages they offered
agricultural labor. The talukdar's son responded by striding around at the weekly market
with a gun slung over his shoulder, threatening that he would shoot anyone who offered
laborers more than the "going rate." This temporarily thwarted the middle peasants'
efforts.
However, new opportunities  offered by tubewells and the opening of a milk-
collection center in the village made it increasingly difficult for the talukdars to retain their
position in the village society and economy.  Over time, the middle-level peasants were
successful in raising their incomes, and offered a greater multiplicity of sources of
employment and credit for the poor. The bi-polar polity of the village changed into one
with a broader distribution of power.
In a study of another Uttar Pradesh village, Dreze, Lanjouw, and Sharma (1998)
noted similar tensions between the same middle peasant group and the ex-talukdars.  There,
the talukdars had tried methods such as arson and election-rigging to maintain their power,
but the middle peasants'  determined use of the new agrarian opportunities  was eventually
successful in challenging the hegemony of the talukdars.  By the 1990s, the middle peasants
had become prosperous and educated, and formed a serious challenge to the talukdars in
the village polity.
Source: Vinod Jairath and Monica Das Gupta, fieldnotes from Hardoi district.
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